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NOTES
UNCLAIMED BILLIONS: FEDERAL
ENCROACHMENT ON STATES' RIGHTS IN
ABANDONED PROPERTY
I. INTRODUCTION
United States residents have abandoned and continue to aban-
don tangible and intangible property valued at billions of dollars.'
In 1991, under state unclaimed property laws, the fifty states took
custody of over $1.2 billion in unclaimed property assets. 2 Current
state unclaimed property legislation, traditionally called "escheat,"
empowers states to take title to, or claim custody of, most intangible
property that has remained unclaimed and therefore is presumed
abandoned. 3 Although escheat originally meant that the state be-
came absolute owner of the property, the term escheat is also used
to include custody of unclaimed property.`'
Despite a general acknowledgment of sovereign state authority
to regulate unclaimed property, 5
 the federal government has quietly
taken control of unclaimed property valued in excess of $6.5 billion,
Telephone Interview with Patty White, Secretary of the National Association of Un-
claimed Property Administrators during the 1991 term (Mar. I I, 1992); see also Andrew W.
McThenia, Jr. & David J. Epstein, Issues of Sovereignty in Escheat and the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1983) (in 1962 the value of unclaimed
property, estimated at $15 billion, was growing at the rate of $1 billion annually).
2 Telephone Interview with Patty White, supra note I.
' See, e.g., Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 Gown'. L. REV. 1319, 1330
(1961) (modern statutes focus on abandonment as a cause for escheat); Comment, A Survey
of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes, 9 ST. Louts U. L.J. 85, 85 (1964) (modern
escheat occurs when property has remained unclaimed for a specified period of time). All
states also continue to escheat real and personal property where a resident has died intestate
without heirs and the state has been appointed administrator of the estate. 1 DAvtoi. EPSTEIN
ET AL., UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW AND REPORTING FORMS § 1.05 (1990). This note focuses
on state claims to intangible property in situations when the property is presumed abandoned,
not when a resident has died intestate.
' See, e.g., Survey, supra note 3, at 85 ("escheat" used to denote state control of unclaimed
property); Jo Beth Prewitt, Note, Unclaimed Property—A Potential Source of Non-Tax Revenue,
45 Mo. L. REV. 493, 494 (1980) ("escheat" is used to describe the transfer of custody or title
to the state); cf., Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1331 (state custodial statutes are not true
escheat statutes because they do not give title to unclaimed property). For purposes of this
discussion, "escheat" includes custodial control as well as transfer of title to unclaimed
property.
5
 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the acknowledged
authority for state escheat.
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collected within federal agencies. 6 Although the federal govern-
ment's conduct is not technically "escheat" under traditional law, it
functions essentially the same.? With billions of dollars in the bal-
ance, there is a growing urgency on the part of the states to assert
their sovereign rights in a fiscal battle over abandoned property in
federal custody. 8
 Absent controlling federal law, or common law, it
remains unclear who has the better right to claim these assets for
the missing owners.9
The early American colonies initially adopted the principles of
unclaimed property law from English common law.'° Under English
law, the doctrine of escheat allowed the English Crown to take title
to unowned real property that usually consisted of land belonging
to a tenant who had died intestate, without legal heirs." Similarly,
the English doctrine of bona vacantia operated to empower the
Crown to claim unowned personal property.' 2
 In the United States,
the English escheat and bona vacantia doctrines were merged into a
single escheat doctrine, granting states sovereign rights to aban-
doned property.' 3
 Gradually, the states codified the doctrine to
cover all types of intangible property that is presumed abandoned."
fi U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNCLAIMED MONEY: PROPOSALS FOR TRANSFERRING
UNCLAIMED FUNDS TO STATES 4 (May 1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (approximately $1.5
billion in unclaimed property collected by several federal agencies); Telephone Interview
with Andy Montgomery, Assistant Director of Public Affairs, Financial Management Service
( June 19, 1992) (the Financial Management Service assessed the value of pre-1989 unclaimed
federal treasury checks at $5 billion).
7 See, e.g., Note, Escheat of Corporate Dividends, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1413 (1952) (the
federal government exercises powers very similar to escheat); Modern Escheat, supra note 3,
at 1336-37 (in several instances the federal government has exercised power similar to
escheat).
8 See, e.g., Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama v,
Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991) (23 states attempted to claim custodial escheat of unclaimed
funds in federal custody). The states have also supported legislation that would transfer
unclaimed money collected by federal agencies to the states. S. 1612, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1987).
9 See infra notes 229-367 and accompanying text For a discussion of the states' and the
federal government's right to claim the assets.
i° See Ray H. Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 Kv.
L.J. 302, 303-04 (1947).
See id. at 302; Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1319-20.
12 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1326.
" M. at 1327; Prewitt, supra note 4, at 493.
14
 ALA. CODE §§ 35-12-1 to -50 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.45.010—.780 (1990 & Supp.
1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-301 to -340 (1987 & Supp, 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-
28.201 to -232 (Michie 1987 & Supp..1991); CAL. Gni. PROC. CODE §§ 1500-1599 (West 1982
& Supp. 1992); Cow. REV. STAT. §§ 38-13.101 to -134 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-
56 to 3-76 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1130-1224 (1987 & Supp.
1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-201 to -242 (1981 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 717.001—
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Unlike their early English counterparts, almost all modern
American escheat statutes are custodial in nature." While states
have possession of unclaimed property, the true owner never loses
title to the property and thus can successfully reclaim it at any time."
Most states have adopted unclaimed property laws that are modeled
after the 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act''
("1954 Uniform Act"), its 1966 revision" ("1966 Uniform Revision")
or the 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act" ("1981 Uniform
Act"). 2° The goal of the proposed uniform legislation was to settle
interstate controversies over the right to abandoned intangible
property that could not be readily identified with any one state. 2 '
.1401 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-190 to -243 (Michie 1982 Sr Supp.
1991); HAW. REV. STAT. HI 523A-1 to -41 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 14-501 to -543 (1979
& Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 141, 11101-146 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-9-1-1 to -45 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1991); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 556.1—.36
(West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §"§ 58-3901 to -3932 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
393.010—.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:151
to 9:188 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1801-1875 (West Supp.
1991); MD. COM. LAW. II CODE ANN. §§ 17-101 to -326 (1990 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 200A, §§ 1-17 (1981 & Supp. 1992); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.733(1)—.734(4) (Callaghan
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.31—.60 (West 1990); Miss. CODE ANN: §§ 89-12-1 to -57
(Supp, 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 447.500—.595 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-9.101 to -316 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-1301 to -1332 (1990); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 120A.010—.450 (1986 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 471-C:1 to -C:43
(1983 & Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:30B-1 to -108 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN,
§§ 7-8-1 to -34 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW §§ 101-1500 (McKinney
1991 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-1 to -49 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-30.1-
01 to -38 (1978 & Supp. 1991); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 169.01—.99 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 651.1 to 685.1 (West 1971 & Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 98.302-
.436 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 1301.1—.29 (1991 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-21.1-
1 to -41 (1984 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27.18-10 to .400 (Law, Co-op. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43.41A-1 to -57 (1983 & Supp, 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-29-
101 to -204 (1982 & Supp. 1991); TEX, PROP, CODE ANN. §§ 72.001 to 75.102 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-44-1 to -40 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 §§ 1208-
1238 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-210.1 to 210.30 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 63.24.010—.170 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-8-1 to -31
(1985 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 177.01—.40 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. §§ 26-
30-101 to -104 (1991).
18 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1432 (most statutes are purely custodial in
nature); Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1330 (most abandoned property statutes are protec-
tive and custodial). There are, however, several states that continue to have provisions for
taking title to unclaimed property. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-9.1-36 (Burns Supp. 1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 471-C:30 (Supp. 1990).
McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1432-33.
17 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215 (1966).
18 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 135 (1966).
12 UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617 (1981).
20 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.06[1].
21 See 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215, 215—
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Subsequent judicial enforcement of state unclaimed property leg-
islation has reinforced the states' authority and power to regulate
tangible and intangible unclaimed property. 22
Despite a legislatively and judicially recognized state right to
escheat, 23 the federal government has claimed rights similar to es-
cheat with respect to certain property in its custody. 24 Claiming
preemptive federal law established under federal war powers, fed-
eral agencies have removed abandoned veterans' property from
state control. 25 Fiscally even more significant, several federal agen-
cies also claim that federal custody statutes preempt state unclaimed
property laws.26
 Thus, the federal government, under the guise of
preemption, has taken custody of billions of' dollars worth of assets
in abandoned property that state residents formerly owned. 27
This note focuses on the conflicts that have arisen between
federal agencies and the states over federal "carving out" of custo-
dial unclaimed property rights. Section II sets forth the English
historical roots of modern American unclaimed property law." Sec-
tion III discusses the development of state legislation and the cor-
responding judicial decisions that influenced the development of
17 (1966) (prefatory note discusses multiple state claims to some intangible property); UNI-
FORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 135, 137-38 (1966)(prefatory
note discusses the problem of intangible property having multiple locations); UNIFORM UN-
CLAIMED PROPERTY Acr, 8A U.L.A. 617, 617 (1981) (prefatory note discusses the rule that
will be followed to resolve the problem of multiple state claims to intangible property); see
also Survey, supra note 3, at 87 (Uniform Act was necessary because of multiple state claims
to intangible property).
22 See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Escheat, Unclaimed Property, and the Supreme Court, 17 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 50, 82 (1965) (survey of United States Supreme Court rulings on state unclaimed
property legislation indicates that the Court has been very supportive and permissive of state
legislation).
25 See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of
states' rights to escheat.
24 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6408 (1988) (providing that state escheat laws do not apply to
unclaimed refunds of federal tax); 38 U.S.C. § 5200 (1988), amended by 38 U.S.C.A. § 8520
(West 1991) (providing that title to veterans' property vests in the United States if they die
intestate without heirs in a veterans' hospital).
25 38 U.S.C. § 5200 (1988), amended by 38 U.S.C.A. § 8520 (West 1991). See infra note
299 for a discussion of congressional war powers granted by the United States Constitution.
26 See Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332, 334-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 584
(1991) (U.S. Treasurer claimed that unclaimed property collected by various federal agencies
and transferred to the U.S. Treasury was not subject to state unclaimed property laws).
27 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (information from six federal agencies indicated that
from 1982 to 1987 they had accumulated about $1.5 billion in payable claims); Telephone
Interview with Andy Montgomery, supra note 6 (the Financial Management Service estimated
that the pre-1989 unclaimed treasury checks totalled $5 billion).
2' See infra notes 33-119 and accompanying text.
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the Uniform Acts. 29 Section IV outlines federal attempts to carve
out from state authority certain types of unclaimed property." Sec-
tion IV also examines the current controversy between the federal
and state governments with respect to rights to the custody of
unclaimed property in federal control. Finally, section V discusses
various issues raised by states' claims to the property held in federal
custody, and concludes that the states have more legitimate rights
to unclaimed property in federal control than does the federal
government. 32
II. THE EARLY ENGLISH DOCTRINES OF ESCHEAT AND BONA
VACANTIA: ROOTS OF AMERICAN LAW
The states, not the federal government, assumed the sovereign
rights of the Crown. 33 Thus, the English common law rights of
escheat and bona vacantia that provided for the disposition of un-
claimed property were left with the states. 34 These doctrines have
been modified by the states; under most state law, when intangible
property has been unclaimed for a prescribed period of time, there
is a presumption of abandonment and the state may claim custody
of the property. 35
A. American Interpretation of an English Tradition
Unclaimed property legislation has its roots in the English com-
mon law doctrines of escheat and bona vacantia.s" Under the English
common law doctrine of escheat, unowned real property that failed
to pass under a will when a tenant died intestate automatically
reverted to the tenant's lord." Generally, the companion doctrine
of bona vacantia dictated that the English Crown could claim
unowned personal property." The personal property often con-
29 See infra notes 120-228 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 229-348 and accompanying text.
"L See infra notes 349-71 and accompanying (ext.
92 See infra notes 372-96 and accompanying text.
" McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1431.
99 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1336.
99 See 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Act . , 8A U.L.A. 215 (1966)
(sections two through nine of the Act describe the time period property is to remain un-
claimed before there is a presumption of abandonment); Modern Escheat, supra note '3, at
1330 (abandonment is presumed when the owner cannot be located).
Prewitt, supra note 4, at 493.
37 Garrison, supra note 10, at 302.
38 Id. at 303.
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sisted of personalty remaining in an estate when the real property
was escheated." However, bona vacantia also applied to personal
property held in a failed trust and personal property that remained
after the dissolution of a corporation."
The purpose behind the English common law doctrine of es-
cheat was to ensure feudal tenures. 4 ' The reversion of real property
to the feudal lord ensured that if the tenant or his bloodline no
longer provided services to the lord, the land would return to the
lord to be reconveyed. 42 Nevertheless, with the disintegration of the
feudal structure, the bloodline rationale became obsolete and es-
cheat came to be considered a royal prerogative." The Crown's
claim to unowned personal property under the doctrine of bona
vacantia was based on the assumption that the Crown had a more
equitable right to the unclaimed property than a stranger." The
Crown's right to bona vacantia was generally operative only when
there was no owner, not when the owner was merely unknown."
The American states adopted the broad principles of English
common law escheat and bona vacantia under a unified doctrine of
escheat." In the early 1800s, American escheat was like English
escheat and applied only to real property of a citizen who died
intestate without legal heirs. 47 States attempting to claim title to
unowned personal and intangible property using the English doc-
trine of bona vacantia were generally unsuccessful."
For example, in the 1939 case of Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Slattery, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that the state of Illinois could not claim abandoned utility
39 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1327.
42 Id. at 1327-28; Comment, Bona Vacantia Resurrected, 34 ILt,. L. REV. of Nw. U. 171,
178 (1939).
4' See Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1319-20.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1320.
44 Id. at 1326-27.
43 Id. at 1326.
46 See State v. Standard Oil Co., 74 A.2d 565, 572 (N.J. 1950) (doctrine of escheat was
eventually extended to include personal property, tangible and intangible); Prewitt, supra
note 4, at 493.
4' I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, 1.04131.
48 See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 68 (7th Cir. 1939) (reasoning
that the doctrine of bona vacantia was too indefinite to be a rule of law in Illinois); cf., New
Jersey v. Elsinore Shore Assoc., 592 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (quoting
a New Jersey statute that states that the common law doctrine of bans vacantia applies to
unclaimed property not specifically covered under other unclaimed property laws); see gen-
erally Bona Vacantia Resurrected, supra note 40 (commenting on Slattery).
September 1992] 	 UNCLAIMED PROPERTY	 1043
refunds under the doctrine of bona vacantia. 49 In Slattery, the tele-
phone company had overcharged for services and had been ordered
to refund the money, but not all the refunds were claimed. 5° The
State of Illinois claimed the remaining funds. 51 Although the court
ruled against the State on other grounds, it reasoned that the com-
mon law doctrine of bona vacantia was of such an uncertain and
indefinite nature that the court did not feel justified in declaring it
a rule of Illinois law, 52
Subsequently, most states enacted legislation to cover the dis-
position of intangible property based on the doctrine of escheat,
rather than bona vacantia. 53 Thus, the English principles of escheat
and bona vacantia merged under the doctrine of escheat rather than
continuing as separate doctrines. 54 Modern American unclaimed
property legislation differs from its English roots in that under
United States law, it is not necessary for escheated property to have
been passed intestate. 55 Modern statutes contain a presumption of
abandonment; thus, property becomes deliverable to the custody of
the state after it has remained unclaimed for a period of time,
usually five to fifteen years. 56 For instance, the state can often claim
unclaimed checking account balances after five years while traveler's
checks must remain unclaimed for fifteen years."
Moreover, modern American escheat legislation, unlike early
English common law, is primarily a custodial claim rather than an
absolute taking of title. 58 Under English escheat and bona vacantia
doctrines, absolute title reverted to the Crown when the property
was escheated or claimed. 59 In contrast, although several unclaimed
property statutes are still called escheat acts, today very few statutes
allow for the ultimate transfer of title to the abandoned property
to the state.° Although those few states retain the right to initiate
49
 102 F.2d at 68.
55 Id. at 60-62.
51 Id. at 62.
"Id. at 68.
5s
	 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., Supra note 3, § 1.04[21 & n.9.
54 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1327; Prewitt, supra note 4, at 493.
55 See Sentell, supra note 22, at 50-51.
55 See, e.g., UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 622, 635 (1981) (most
intangible property is presumed abandoned after five years of remaining unclaimed, whereas
traveler's checks are presumed abandoned after 15 years).
" Id. at 622, 630, 635.
" McThenia & Epstein, supra note I, at 1432.
" Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1320, 1326.
"E.g., IND. CODE ANN, 32-9-1-36 (Burns Supp. 1991): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 471-
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proceedings to foreclose and acquire title, most states act only as
custodians and hold the property until the original owners or their
heirs appear to claim the property." Thus, the states are actually
claiming an obligation, not the property itself. 62
Commentators have asserted that there are several advantages
to custodial escheat laws as opposed to absolute escheat laws." Cus-
todial statutes, they assert, are easier to administer because there is
no need to obtain a court order foreclosing title to the property."
In addition, although the states must maintain permanent records
of all property, state administrators have argued that the procedural
requirements for custodial escheat are simpler. 65
In sum, American states' unclaimed property statutes do not
completely parallel earlier English escheat and bona vacantia doc-
trines. Unlike their historical predecessors, American state statutes
are custodial and do not result in a transfer of title. They are based
on abandonment rather than intestate succession and they apply
primarily to intangible property. Despite these differences, however,
the American laws still reflect the English presumption that the
state, rather than the fortuitous individual "holder" of the property,
has a more equitable claim to unclaimed property. 66
B. The States Assumed the Sovereign Escheat Powers
Absent a royal family, the states assumed the Crown's claims of
sovereignty and the power to escheat. 67 Thus, the individual states,
rather than the federal government, asserted the right to escheat
abandoned property." Some commentators and courts have stated
that this early assertion of authority was based on the state assump-
tion of the sovereign power of the people.69 Other courts reasoned
that traditionally, the states possess the right to regulate succession
C:30 (Supp. 1990). It has been suggested, however, that these absolute escheat provisions
are rarely used. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.06[1].
61 McThenia & Epstein, supra note I, at 1432.
62 See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 3, § 9.02[1].
65 See id. § 1.06[2].
64 See id. § 1.06[1].
65 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION or UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215, 216 (1966).
w See Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1326-27.
67 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1431; Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1336.
66 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1336.
69 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1431; see also Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell,
108 A.2d 441, 442 (1919) (the state, by virtue of its sovereign power, may take charge of
property that is abandoned, unclaimed for a period of time, or that has no known owner).
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of property." Yet other courts have termed escheat a state police
power and concluded that under the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, escheat power is reserved to the states. 7 '
Although courts and commentators give a number of rationales for
state escheat, it is widely accepted that the regulation of the dispo-
sition of unclaimed property is a state right."
Beginning in the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the states' historic right to regulate both real and personal
unclaimed property." For example, in 1896, in one of the early
escheat cases, Hamilton v. Brown, the Court upheld a Texas escheat
statute that vested title to real property in the state when the owner
died intestate." Under Texas law, title to a parcel of land had been
vested in the State of Texas when a citizen died without known
heirs." In Hamilton, the State had sold the property at auction. 76
Later, persons claiming to be heirs appeared and challenged the
purchaser's title."
The United States Supreme Court held that the Texas statute
was constitutional." The Hamilton Court reasoned that in the United
States, when title to land fails for want of heirs, it escheats to the
state. 79 The Court further reasoned that the statutory notice re-
quirements provided the defendants with due process." Thus, the
Hamilton Court held that title had properly vested in the State.'"
Likewise, in 1905, in Cunnius v. Reading School District, the
United States Supreme Court supported state administration of
7" E.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (the
power to regulate succession of property is a traditional state right); Greenough v. People's
Say. Rank, 94 A. 706, 709 (R.I. 1915) (the power of a state to pass an unclaimed property
law rests on its right to provide for the care and custody of property).
7t See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 434 F. Supp. 64, 67 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (control over
abandoned property is traditionally left to the states under their police power); In re Montana
Pac. Oil & Gas Co., 614 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Mont. 1980) (Montana's unclaimed property law
is a valid exercise of the sovereign police power to protect all property within the state).
72 See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965) (it is unquestioned that the
state where the property is located may escheat tangible unclaimed property); Connecticut
Mut. Life Iris. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (the state may more properly be
custodian and beneficiary of abandoned property than any person).
73 See Semen, supra note 22, at 52-82 (survey of all Supreme Court decisions on un-
claimed property up to 1965).
74 161 U.S. 256, 264-65, 274 (1896).
75 1d. at 262.
76 Id.
" Id.
78 Id. at 274.
79 Id. at 263.
wi Id. at 274.
Ill Id.
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unclaimed intangible personal property. 82 The female plaintiff in
Cunnius had been entitled through dower rights to an annual inter-
est payment from the defendant, but she had not been located for
over nine years." Pennsylvania law provided that the state could
administer the estate of persons who had been previously domiciled
in Pennsylvania, but who had been absent without contact for seven
or more years.84 The statute required publication and a court hear-
ing and then allowed for a presumption of death of the owner of
the estate. 85 In Cunnius, the plaintiff reappeared after nine years
and sued for the previously owed payments, claiming that the Penn-
sylvania statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 86
The Cunnius Court reasoned that the right to regulate estates
of absent owners is a necessary power of government and that the
statute was an appropriate exercise of Pennsylvania's legislative
power." The Court further reasoned that the procedural require-
ments provided sufficient protection of the absent owner's due
process rights. 88 Thus, the Cunnius Court held that the Pennsylvania
statute that provided for the administration of estates of long absent
persons was valid and did not deprive the missing person of his or
her property without due process of law. 89
Although both Hamilton and Cunnius support the states' right
to escheat from individuals, they did not address the states' rights
as against institutional entities holding the unclaimed property (the
"holder"). In 1910, the United States Supreme 'Court addressed
institutional entities in Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone and
upheld a Massachusetts statute that provided for payment to the
state of bank deposits that had been inactive for a period of thirty
years. 9° Citing Cunnius, the Malone Court reasoned that the states
had an undoubted right and power to legislate in the area of un-
claimed property. 9 ' The Court reasoned, that because the Massa-
chusetts statute was custodial and did not escheat title to the state,
it protected the depositors and was merely a transference of custody
Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist. No. 165, 198 U.S. 458, 477 (1905).
" Id. at 460-61.
" Id. at 458-59.
"Id. at 459.
66 Id. at 462,469.
67 /d. at 469.
"Id, at 477.
"See id.
9° 221 U.S. 660, 661-62, 666 (1911).
°I Id. at 664.
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from the bank to the state. 92 Consequently, the Malone Court held
that the Massachusetts statute was valid and constitutional. 93 Thus,
Malone, Cunnius and Hamilton established the constitutionality of
state escheat legislation regulating unclaimed real and personal
property.
Commentators have asserted a number of rationales that sup-
port state collection and custody of unclaimed property. 94 Com-
mentators advocating unclaimed property legislation have often
used the "windfall" rationale: an individual holder of unclaimed
property should not get a windfall simply because the owner never
appears; rather, the windfall should benefit society as a whole.95
The commissioners who drafted the first Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act stated that one of the main purposes for
state unclaimed property legislation was to prevent an unfair wind-
fall to fortuitous holders of property."
In addition, commentators have supported state custodial es-
cheat as important for the protection of the missing owner's rights. 97
One commentator argues that because state unclaimed property
acts generally require the state to make efforts to locate the missing
owner, there is a higher likelihood that the property will be returned
to the owner than if the holder could retain the property indefi-
nitely." In addition, at least one commentator argues that the owner
is better protected, because the state is a safer custodian than most
holders as its taxing power ensures repayment in perpetuity to the
rightful owner." The National Association of Unclaimed Property
Administrators supports this argument with statistics showing that
in 1991, the state returned previously unclaimed property valued
at approximately $230 million to owners. '°°
In addition, the commissioners drafting the 1954 Uniform Act
argued that state control of unclaimed property benefits the non-
owner holder because it relieves the holder of responsibility and
" See id. at 664-66.
93 Id. at 666.
" See, e.g., 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note '3, § 1.07; Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112
U. PA. L. Rcv. 95, 96-103 (1963).
" See Modem Rationales, supra note 94, at 101-02.
96 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215, 217 (1966).
97 See, e.g., I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.0612]; Modem Rationales, supra note 94, at
97.
" See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.0614
"See, e.g., Modern Rationales, supra note 94, at 98 (owners are protected because of the
state's taxing power).
166
 Telephone interview with Patty White, supra note 1.
1048	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:1037
liability related to accounting for the unclaimed property.'°' They
reasoned that the issue of liability had become especially critical in
light of potential multistate claims to the same intangible prop-
erty. 102 By taking custody of the property, the state also takes over
the responsibility of handling subsequent claims by other states or
the owner.'" In addition, the state takes on the holder's burden of
maintaining permanent records on the abandoned property.'"
Finally, some commentators cite the revenue potential of un-
claimed funds as the significant motivation for supporting state
escheat rights. 10' One commentator suggests that since colonial
times, state escheat has been a source of revenue whenever persons
died intestate without heirs.'" Escheat based on intestate death
without heirs became less significant as the requirements for legal
heirs became less restrictive.' 07 Many commentators agree, however,
that state unclaimed property statutes have become fiscally signifi-
cant.'" The commissioners drafting the 1954 Uniform Act noted
that the actual possibility of owners claiming their abandoned prop-
erty is not great.'" Thus, the collection of abandoned property,
such as bank accounts, insurance proceeds and stock certificates
provides the state with a significant amount of non-tax revenue."°
Most states acknowledge that there is significant revenue
earned under unclaimed property statutes."' In 1991, the fifty
states collected unclaimed property valued at over $1.2 billion." 2
101 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 216, 217 (1966);
see also State v. First Nail Bank, 313 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1981) (one of the purposes of
the Minnesota unclaimed property act was to relieve holders of the annoyance, expense and
liability of keeping such property); In re Monks Club, Inc. v. State, 394 15.2d 804, 806 (Wash.
1964) (the purpose of the 1954 Uniform Act was for state custody to relieve the holder from
annoyance, expense and liability).
162 See 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 216, 217
(1966).
100 See id. at 265.
164 Id. at 216.
105 See, e.g., McThenia & Epstein, supra note I, at 1431-32; Prewitt, supra note 4, at 494—
95.
1 °6 See Garrison, supra note 10, at 314.
107
 Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1321. Once illegitimate children and aliens were
allowed to inherit, less property was subject to escheat. Id.
10" See, e.g., I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.07; Garrison, supra note 10, at 314;
McThenia & Epstein, supra note I, at 1431-32; Modern Rationales, supra note 94, at 102-03;
Prewitt, supra note 4, at 494-95.
1 °9 1954 UNIFORM DisposiTioN of UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215, 216 (1966).
nu Id. at 216-17.
In Telephone Interview with Patty White, supra note I.
112 Id. The National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators compiles annual
figures on state collection of unclaimed property. Id.
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In addition, commentators suggest that as states become more fis-
cally strapped, and as many go deeply into debt, the non-tax source
of revenue from collecting unclaimed property becomes increas-
ingly important." 3
In sum, modern state unclaimed property statutes were origi-
nally adopted from English common law, with numerous significant
modifications." 4 Unlike English law, United States escheat provides
for a presumption of abandonment and statutes are generally cus-
todial, covering primarily intangible property. 15 The states assumed
the sovereign rights of the English Grown, including escheat pow-
ers." 6 The United States Supreme Court in Hamilton, Cunnius and
Malone affirmed this Americanized escheat after the turn of the
century.'" Advocates of state custodial escheat have concluded that
state unclaimed property statutes are in society's, the owner's, the
state's and the holder's best interests." 8 These commentators con-
cluck that the owner can appear and successfully reclaim property,
the holder is relieved of liability and the state gets a significant
amount of non-tax revenue, thus benefiting society." 9
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESCHEAT STATUTES: JURISDICTIONAL
ISSUES AND A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
Although as adopted from English common law, escheat power
flowed from the Crown to state legislatures, the transfer of power
was not without problems.' 2° In the absence of a uniform approach,
commentators note that early state escheat laws were often haphaz-
ard.' 21 As more states enacted comprehensive unclaimed property
laws, abandoned intangible property became a source of conflict
among various claiming states because it was not clearly located in
any one state.' 22 These conflicts led to the drafting of uniform state
legislation and several United States Supreme Court decisions.' 23
113 E.g., McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1431-32; l'rewitt, supra note 4, at 510.
1 " See supra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
HS See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
" 6 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text,
17 See supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra notes 94-113 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
in See Garrison, supra note 10, at 302-04.
121 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 215,216 (1966)
(commissioners commented that statutory provisions were diverse and often not well for-
mulated).
' 22 Survey, supra note 3, at 87.
'23/d.
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In the early 1900s, unclaimed property legislation was rarely
comprehensive and often applied only to selective types of prop-
erty. 124 For example, in 1872, Pennsylvania enacted a statute to
claim abandoned bank deposits and in 1934, New York enacted
legislation to take unclaimed utility refunds.' 25 In 1940, Kentucky
provided one of the first comprehensive plans for the disposition
of many types of unclaimed property, such as bank deposits, utility
deposits, money orders, stocks and dividends.' 26 Kentucky's early
state unclaimed property statutes established a statutory time period
that property had to be unclaimed before there was a presumption
of abandonment.' 27
 It also established its own requirements for
trying to locate missing owners, such as publication in newspa-
pers.' 28
 With the growing popularity of state unclaimed property
statutes as a new source of state revenue in the 1950s, uniformity
of such laws became a necessity.' 29
 The use of intangible property,
such as stock certificates and money orders, made it unclear as to
which state's statute controlled claims for abandoned property.' 3°
For example, if unclaimed intangible property, such as corpo-
rate stock, is abandoned, there are several states that might attempt
to claim custody based on jurisdiction over the corporate issuer or
holder of the property.im The stock could be covered under the
law of the state where the company was incorporated, or the state
where the corporate headquarters was located.' 32
 In addition, any
state that was doing significant business with the corporation might
claim the property.' 33
The conflict among the states over competing escheat claims
quickly became a widely litigated issue. In 1948, for example, in
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, the United States
Supreme Court considered the claim of nine insurance companies,
all located outside of the State of New York, that custodial New
' 24 See Garrison, supra note 10, at 307.
128
 Id. at 306.
"6 Id. at 308.
"7 /c/. at 309.
128 Id.
128
 See, e.g., Survey, supra note 3, at 87.
136
 See, e.g., McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1434; Survey, supra note 3, at 85.
Because intangible property, such as stock certificates, is property that has no intrinsic value
in and of itself, but is merely representative of value, it does not have a clear location. Survey,
supra note 3, at 85.
" 1 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1434.
"2 Id.
"Id. at 1435.
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York escheat laws were invalid as applied to unclaimed policy pro-
ceeds that they owed to New York residents.'" Because no other
state was party to the suit, the Court did not address competing
state claims to the same property and held that the New York state
escheat law was valid.'" The plaintiffs in Moore were nonresident
corporations that had claimed that enforcement of New York es-
cheat statutes violated due process because New York did not have
jurisdiction over the assets of out-of-state companies.'" They fur-
ther alleged that turning over the unclaimed policy proceeds to the
State would impair their insurance contracts because the State did
not have to fulfill the policy owners' obligations.' 37
The Moore Court reasoned that the State was the best custodian
and beneficiary of abandoned property.'" In addition, the Court
reasoned that the State was acting as a conservator and was not
party to a contract between the policyholder and the insurance
company.'" The Court also noted that the contacts between the
insurance companies and the State of New York as a result of selling
policies to New York citizens were a significant fact when determin-
ing jurisdiction over intangible property.' 4° Thus, concluding that
there was no impairment of contract, and that New York had juris-
diction over the insurance companies through their contact with
New York, the Moore Court held that the New York statute was
In his dissenting opinion to Moore, Justice Jackson argued that
the Court failed to address competing claims by other states not
party to the suit. 142 He argued that the majority ruling that allowed
jurisdiction when there was "sufficient contact" between a holder
and a state was too vague."' He reasoned that the Court should
not have made a declaratory judgment but rather should have
1 " 333 U.S. 541,542 (1948). The Court noted that section 700 of article VII of the New
York Abandoned Property Law, entitled "Unclaimed Life Insurance Funds," included foreign
life insurance corporations and provided that most life insurance policies were to be pre-
sumed abandoned if the insured or the beneficiaries had not claimed the value of the policy
within seven years after the policy reached its limiting age. Id. at 542-43.
us Id. at 551.
136 Id. at 544-45.
'" Id. at 545-46.
138 /d. at 546.
1'9
	
at 547. Accordingly, the state was not required to satisfy certain policy terms. Id.
10 Id. at 548-49,
14L Id. at 551.
12 Id. at 557 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 557-58 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).
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waited until there was a case where multiple states were party to
the suit.' 44
A few years later, in 1951, the United States Supreme Court
again addressed a state escheat conflict; however, the Court did not
settle the issue of competing state claims to unclaimed intangible
property.' 45 Rather, in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, the Court
upheld a New Jersey unclaimed property law that allowed escheat
of unclaimed intangible property held by corporations domiciled in
New Jersey.' 46 The Court reasoned this time that the state of cor-
porate domicile also had jurisdiction to escheat unclaimed prop-
erty. 147
In Standard Oil, New Jersey law allowed absolute escheat of
unclaimed stock and stock dividends of New Jersey corporations
even when the stock had been issued to owners who were not
residents of New Jersey. 148 In Standard Oil, although the corporation
holding the unclaimed stock was a New Jersey corporation, the
company did not have any tangible property in the state except for
its stock and transfer books.' 49 Pursuant to the New Jersey statute,
personal service had been made on the corporation and attempts
had been made to notify the missing owners through publication. ' 5°
The Standard Oil Court reasoned that a state may use its legis-
lative power to dispose of unclaimed property "within its reach."'"
Thus, states with personal jurisdiction over the corporate holder
could escheat the unclaimed property.' 52 Although the Court ac-
knowledged that with intangible property the actual location of the
stock was unclear, it reasoned that the holder would be protected
from multiple claims by other states, because states must give full
faith and credit to a valid court ruling of another state.' 53 The
Court further reasoned that the statute provided for sufficient no-
tice to all involved parties.'" Therefore, the Standard Oil Court
144 Id. at 564 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).
015 See Standard Oil Co. v. New jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 429 (1951).
146 Id. at 430,443.
147 See id. at 439-40.
18 See id. at 430. The New Jersey Escheat Act provided that when the owner of any
personal property within the state remained unknown for fourteen years, the property
escheated to the state. Id.
112 Id. at 437.
055 Id. at 433.
051
 Id. at 435-36.
L52 See id. at 439.
E55 Id. at 437-38,443.
L54 Id. at 443.
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upheld the New Jersey law that provided for state escheat of un-
claimed intangible property held by New Jersey corporations: 63
Thus, after Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore and Stan-
dard Oil Co. u. New Jersey, both the state of the property owner's
domicile as well as the state of the corporate holder's domicile had
authority to escheat unclaimed intangible property:" These cases
created a race of diligence between two competing states: 37
Consequently, some states began to enact unclaimed property
legislation that contained broad claims of sovereignty, providing for
state escheat of intangible property from holders having any con-
nection at all to the state.'" States also began passing legislation that
provided shorter time periods for presumed abandonment: 39
Thus, the result of the judicial ruling was that states competed to
become the first to escheat unclaimed property.'"" In sum, in 1954,
state escheat of unclaimed property was based on a state having
jurisdiction over the holder.'"' As in Moore and Standard Oil, as long
as there were sufficient contacts between the holder and the state
attempting to escheat, the state had a valid claim: 62 Because several
states could often claim such jurisdiction, it was unclear which state
had a priority claim: 63
In 1954, in response to the "race to escheat" created under
Moore and Standard Oil, and the lack of uniform comprehensive
state escheat legislation, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act. 164 The commissioners stated that if the states
widely adopted the Uniform Act, it could solve both the problem
of diverse state statutes as well as that of multiple states claiming
the same intangible property.'° 5 Although the 1954 Act continued
1 " Id.
1" See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1439; Prewitt, supra note 4, at 495-96.
1 " McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1439-40.
15 " See id. at 1436.
15" See, e.g., I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 2.03]2][d] (abandonment periods of 14 to
20 years were common prior to the Standard Oil decision, but by 1954 several states had
shortened the period to seven years).
L"" Id. at 1490.
tfil See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.00[1]; see also UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 619 (1981),
ut2 l EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.00[1].
'"' See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1937-38.
L 64 1954 DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U. L.A. 215, 215-16 (1966).
165 Id. at 217. Several states still have a modified version of the 1954 Uniform Act as
their principal unclaimed property law. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-190 to -243 (Michie
1982 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. lit. 60, §§ 651.1-685.1 (West 1971 & Supp. 1992).
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to assume that personal jurisdiction over the holder was necessary
for escheat of its unclaimed property, the 1954 Act also attempted
to settle multistate claims to the same property by including a re-
ciprocity clause.' 66 The reciprocity clause established the state of
the owner's domicile as the prevailing state when there were mul-
tiple state claims.'67
The 1954 version of the Uniform Act ("1954 Act") provides
for state custodial escheat of various types of intangible property.' 68
The 1954 Act defines and describes the circumstances under which
various classes of property are to be presumed abandoned.' 69 Spe-
cifically, the 1954 Act establishes a seven-year dormancy period for
a presumption of abandonment for most types of intangible prop-
erty.'" The 1954 Act is organized according to the entity holding
the property, for example, banks or utilities."' Section 9 is an
omnibus section that covers all other intangible personal property
that the Act does not otherwise specifically mention.I 72
Section 10 of the 1954 Act attempts to prevent multiple state
claims for intangible property by including a reciprocal provision
that designates the last known address of the owner as the basic test
of jurisdiction."s Thus, under the 1954 Act, if two states claim
custody of the same property, the law of the state of the last known
address of the owner governs. 14 However, the reciprocal provision
limits jurisdiction to the last known address of the owner only when
both states have adopted the 1954 Act.'"
In 1954, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the
1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.'" Despite
the 1954 Act's stated purpose of ending interstate jurisdictional
'a6
	 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, SA U.L.A. 215, 244-
45 (1966).
167
 Id.
168 /d. at 216. The Act also provides for state custodial escheat of the contents of safe
deposit boxes which could include tangible property. Id. at 228.
n Id. at 216 (includes unclaimed property held by banks or other financial organizations,
insurance corporations, public utilities, other business associations, trustees in corporate
dissolution proceedings, fiduciaries, and state courts and other public agencies).
"a Id. at 229.
171 Id. at 223-24.
172 Id. at 216-17.
175 Id. at 217, 244-45.
17.1 Id. at 244-45.
'" Id. at 245.
"6 1d. at 215.
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conflict, only twelve states had adopted the Act by 1961. 177 Conse-
quently, litigation continued over state jurisdiction of intangible
unclaimed property.
In 1961, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, the
United States Supreme Court again considered the issue of a state
claim to abandoned intangible property that could have multiple
states as claimants.'" In Western Union, Pennsylvania had claimed
escheat of unclaimed money orders issued by the Western Union
Corporation and purchased in Pennsylvania.'" The Western Union
Court held that a Pennsylvania judgment could not bar claims from
other states claiming the same property and did not protect Western
Union from multiple liability; thus, the Pennsylvania court could
not render an escheat judgment.'"
In Western Union, Pennsylvania obtained an escheat judgment
in state court for money orders that were purchased in Pennsylvania
and then unclaimed for over seven years.' 8 ' The holder, or issuer
of the money orders, was a New York corporation, and the payees
on the money orders were primarily from states other than Penn-
sylvania.' 82
 The holder, Western Union, claimed that Pennsylvania
should not be allowed to escheat because according to the decisions
in Moore and Standard Oil, the state of the holder's domicile and the
state of the owner's domicile could also assert escheat rights.'"
The United States Supreme Court reasoned that because no
other states were party to the Pennsylvania escheat judgment, that
escheat by Pennsylvania of the funds would not protect the holder
from escheat claims by states such as the state of the holder's dom-
icile.' 84
 The Court further reasoned that only the United States
Supreme Court could act as the forum for settling multistate dis-
putes over unclaimed property.' 85
 Thus, the Court held that Penn-
sylvania could not preclude other state claims by rendering an
escheat judgment in Pennsylvania court.'"
177 See UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A, 135,136 (1966).
By 1961, the 1954 Act was adopted in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia. Id.
178 368 U.S. 71,73 (1961).
179 Id.
LB° Id. at 80.
LELL
 Id. at 72.
L82 Id. at 72-73.
L " Id. at 77-78.
L84 See id. at 80.
1 " Id. at 79.
1" Id. at 80.
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Shortly thereafter, in 1965, in Texas v. New Jersey, the United
States Supreme Court addressed an escheat claim where multiple
states were parties to the suit. 187 In Texas v. New Jersey, the Court
reasoned that a single rule was necessary to end the multiple state
claims to abandoned intangible property.' 88 The Texas Court held
that when multiple states potentially have jurisdiction for escheat
over unclaimed intangible property, the state of the property own-
er's last known address had the priority claim to escheat.' 89
In Texas v. New Jersey, Texas sought a declaratory judgment
from the United States Supreme Court of its priority right over
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the Sun Oil Company to escheat title
to unclaimed property from Sun 0i1. 19° Texas based its claim on
the grounds that the debts were on the books of the two Texas
offices or owing to persons whose last known address was in
Texas.m New Jersey also sought escheat because Sun Oil was in-
corporated in New jersey.' 92 Pennsylvania claimed the right to es-
cheat the unclaimed property because the holder's principal offices
were located in Pennsylvania.' 93 Sun Oil, the holder of the un-
claimed property, did not claim any interest in the property, but
asked to be protected from double liability.' 94 The State of Florida
later intervened, claiming the right to escheat a portion of the
unclaimed property because some missing owners had last known
addresses in Florida.' 95 The various parties in the case proposed
that the governing law should either be (1) the state with which the
corporate holder had the most contacts, or (2) the state of the
holder's incorporation, or (3) the state of the last known address of
the owner, or (4) the state of the holder's principal place of busi-
ness.' 96
In analyzing the various options, the Texas Court reasoned that
the first option, allowing the amount of holder contact with the state
to govern, would result in a subjective test that would require a
1
" 7 379 U.S. 679, 675 (1965). 	 •
1" Id. at 677.
129 /d. at 681-82.
iwId, at 675.
191 Id. The unclaimed property held by Sun Oil consisted of debts totaling 526,461,65
owed to approximately 1,730 small creditors who had never claimed or cashed checks. Id.
192 Id. at 676.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 677.
,96 /d. at 678-80.
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case-by-case analysis.' 97
 The Court further reasoned that to allow
escheat by the second option, the state of the holder's incorporation,
would make what the Court saw as a minor factor—where the
company happened to be incorporated—too significant. 198 The
Court then reasoned that the fourth option, allowing escheat by the
state where the holder's principal offices were located, would be
"strange," because the unclaimed property is really a liability, not
an asset, but would become an asset once it was escheated.' 99
Thus, the Court held that the simplest, fairest rule was to allow
escheat by the state of the owner's last known address—the third
option. 200 Thus, in 1965, Texas v. New Jersey established the rule that
the state of the owner's last address has the priority claim to escheat
unclaimed intangible property. 2°' This changed the previous prem-
ise that personal jurisdiction over the holder of the property was
necessary for state escheat. 2°2
In 1966, the 1954 Act was revised. 2°3
 The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws stated in the prefatory
note that the revision was to address special problems that had
arisen concerning money orders and traveler's checks. 204 Whereas
the dormancy period for all checks had been seven years under the
1954 Uniform Act, the 1966 Uniform Revision provided a special
fifteen-year dormancy' period for traveler's checks. 2°5 In addition,
the 1966 revision eliminated certain procedural requirements for
issuers of traveler's checks and money orders. 2°6
The revision did not mention the. Supreme Court decision in
Texas v. New Jersey and the new judicial rule that the state of the
owner's last known address had the priority claim to escheat. 207 The
1" Id. at 679.
1 98 Id. at 680.
100
200
 Id. at 680-82.
2°1 Id. at 681-82. The court stated that unclaimed property "is subject to escheat only by
the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown by the debtor's books and
records." Id. at 682. Where there is no last known address or where the state of the last
known address does not provide for escheat, the court held that "the property be subject to
escheat by the state of corporate domicile, provided that another State could later escheat
upon proof that the last known address of the creditor was within its borders." Id.
202
 UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 619 (1981).
207 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 135, 135 (1966).
44 Id. at 136.
100 1d.
2" See id.
207 See generally UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Aar, 8A U.L.A. 135
(1966). There is no clear explanation as to why the 1966 revision ignored the decision in
Texas v. New Jersey.
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1954 Act and the 1966 revision assumed that states having personal
jurisdiction over the holder through contacts with the state could
escheat the property. 208 Therefore, the Uniform Act did not comply
with the Texas ruling and needed to be amended. 209
Rather than revise the 1954 Act again, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided to draft the 1981
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act ("1981 Act"}. 21 ° Commentators
have suggested that the 1981 Act is essentially a revision of the 1954
Act designed to comply with the Supreme Court decision in Texas
v. New ersey. 2 " The Act provides that unclaimed intangible property
is payable to the state of the last known address of the owner. 212
The prefatory note to the 1981 Act describes the other major
changes Made to the 1954 Act. 213 First, the time period during
which the property must remain inactive before there is a pre-
sumption of abandonment has generally been shortened from seven
years to five years.214 The commissioners justified the reduction,
stating that a high inflation rate had increased the cost to the owner
of leaving property dormant. 215 Second, the 1981 Act provides for
express custodial escheat of underlying shares of stock where the
dividends have remained unclaimed. 218 Unlike the 1954 Act, this
covers situations where the stock is not in the possession of the
issuer or a transfer agent, but rather had been issued to the share-
holder. 217
 Third, the 1981 Act provides for regulation of service
charges. 218 The commissioners stated that, over time, service
charges levied against unclaimed property such , as checking and
savings accounts had often eliminated the otherwise unclaimed
property.219
The preface to the 1981 Act also states that the Act is designed
to address changes in practice among the states for the reporting
See UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 619 (1981).
I" Id.
2 Eu Id.
IL L 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 12.00.
212 UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 620 (1981).
2 " See id. at 620-23; see also I EPSTEIN ET_AL., supra note 3, H 12.00—.37 (in-depth
discussion of the 1981 Uniform Act).
2 " UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr, 8A U.L.A. 617, 622-23 (1981).
2 " Id. at 622.
216 /d.
2" Id. Several states had already passed similar legislation. Id.
216 1d. at 623.
219 1d. The commissioners stated that parts of the 1981 Act attempt to codify the case
law regarding service charges on unclaimed property. Id.
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and processing of unclaimed property. 22° Rather than each state
separately pursuing unclaimed property held in all states, the com-
missioners recognized that states have become cooperative in ex-
changing information and even property. 221 The commissioners
noted that the National Association of Unclaimed Property Admin-
istrators ("NAUPA") has facilitated the exchange of information
among the states. 222 NAUPA is a group of state unclaimed property
administrators who meet regularly to discuss key issues and changes
in state disposition of unclaimed property. 223 Thus, the 1981 Act
was drafted to encourage continued and increasing cooperation
among the states by authorizing uniform reporting forms and joint
agreements between states for collection of property. 224
In sum, the 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act, its 1966 revision and the 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act represent comprehensive unclaimed property legislation. 225
The 1954 Act was drafted to help the states regulate unclaimed
property and help clarify multiple state claims to intangible prop-
erty.226 To remain consistent with the judicial ruling that the state
222 See id, at 621.
22 ' Id.
222 1d.
223 Telephone Interview with Patty White, supra note I.
224 UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, SA U,L.A, 617, 621 (1981). The 1981 Act is
oronized into forty-three sections. Id. at 624-25. Section two sets forth the general rule that
tr:1st intangible property held in the ordinary course of business that has remained unclaimed
for more than five years is presumed abandoned. Id. at 630. This is the omnibus section that
covers all property not otherwise specifically provided for in other sections of the 1981 Act.
See id. Sections four through sixteen prescribe specific rules for certain types of property. Id,
at 635-51, Unlike the 1954 Act, the 1981 Act is organized by type of property, rather than
by type of institution holding the property. See id. at 624-25. The twelve specific categories
are traveler's checks and money orders; checks and drafts; bank deposits; funds owing under
life insurance policies; utility deposits; business refunds; stocks; property held in dissolution
of business; property that agents or fiduciaries hold; property that courts and public agencies
hold; gift certificates and credit memos; wages; and contents of safe deposit boxes. id, at
624.
Section three, which outlines the rules for state custody of unclaimed property, conforms
to the ruling in Texas v. New Jersey. Id. at 632-33. Sections seventeen through twenty-nine
are administrative provisions concerning notification and the obligations of the state once it
receives property, as well as the procedure for redeeming property after it is in state custody.
Id. at 651-68. Sections thirty through thirty-five provide the state with enforcement provisions
to ensure compliance with the statute. Id. at 668-75. The holders of property in state
legislatures considering the Act have objected to these final provisions—specifically, the
provisions for interest penalties and the payment of audit costs. See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 3, 12.00[1].
225 See supra notes 164-77, 203-06, 210-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the various versions of the Uniform Acts.
226 1954 UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, SA U.L.A. 215, 215-16
(1966). See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
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of the missing owner's last known address has the priority claim,
the commission drafted the 1981 Act. 227 Presently, forty-two states
and the District of Columbia have enacted some version of the 1951
Uniform Act, the 1966 Uniform Revision or the 1981 Uniform
Act. 228
IV. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE RIGHTS
Once the United States Supreme Court had affirmed state
authority to enact comprehensive unclaimed property legislation,
the states attempted to apply their laws to federally chartered insti-
tutions. 229 Thus began an ongoing struggle between the states and
the federal government over unclaimed money in federal cus-
tody. 23° The states have asserted traditional unclaimed property
rights while the federal government has argued federal preemption
of state law, 23 ' Although the states have prevailed in some situa-
tions, 232 the federal government has prevailed in others. 2s3 The
effect has been that the federal government has carved out blocks
of abandoned property from state contro1. 234 The present-day con-
flict involves billions of dollars in potential non-tax revenue that will
either go to state or federal coffers if the owners are not located. 235
The doctrine of federal preemption is set forth in the Suprem-
acy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution. 236 As
227 UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 617, 617 (198 1).
222 I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.06[1] (Supp. 1991). All other states except one
have enacted comprehensive unclaimed property legislation. Id. See supra note 14 for state
statutes.
229 See, e.g., Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S. 226, 227 (1949) (the state of Michigan attempted
to escheat unclaimed dividends remaining in bank liquidation); Anderson Nat'l Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 235, 239 (1944) (the state of Kentucky attempted to escheat deposits
remaining unclaimed in a liquidated national bank).
230 See, e.g., Arizona v, Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama v.
Bowsher, 112 S. Ct, 584 (1991) (twenty-three states attempted to recover unclaimed funds
held by the United States Treasurer).
231 See id. at 334-35.
232 See, e.g., Lucked, 321 U.S. at 252-53 (state could enforce its unclaimed property law
against the national bank).
233 See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961) (federal government
entitled to retain veterans' property pursuant to federal statute). See infra notes 313-28 and
accompanying text for a complete case discussion of Oregon.
234 See infra notes 297-348 for a discussion of the federal government carving out areas
of unclaimed property from state control.
235 See infra note 6 for a discussion of the amount of unclaimed property in federal
custody.
236 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states in pertinent part that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.
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long as Congress legislates pursuant to its delegated powers, state
law and policy that conflict with a federal law must yield. 237 For a
federal law to have supremacy, it must be made in pursuance of
the express or implied grants contained in the Constitution. 238
The Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Consti-
tution often allows the federal courts to construe federal legislation
as being constitutionally valid. 239 Nevertheless, the Necessary and
Proper Clause is not itself a grant of power, but a caveat stating
that Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the
powers that the Constitution specifically grants. 24° Therefore, Con-
gress must act in an area delegated to it in order for the federal
law to be valid."'
Once a federal law is deemed valid, there are several ways in
which it can preempt state legislation. 242
 The United States Supreme
Court has divided preemption analysis into various categories. 243
These categories include express preemption, conflict preemption
and implied preemption. 244
Express preemption occurs when Congress has explicitly de-
clared its intention to preclude state regulation in a given area. 245
Conflict preemption arises when Congress only partially displaces
state legislation in a particular area. 246
 Conflict exists when compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is impossible or when
state law obstructs the purposes and objectives of Congress. 247
 The
third type, implied preemption, occurs when the federal interest
has occupied the field, when the state law is in a field where the
federal interest is extremely strong or when the state and federal
2" See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspective on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); see also S. Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
917 (1982) [hereinafter ANNOTATED U.S. CoNsTrruTtoN].
2" ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTUTUTZON, supra note 237, at 917.
2"
 Id. at 159. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The Necessary and Proper Clause states in pertinent
part that Congress has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion, in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
240 U.S. v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 653 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court had recently stated that the Necessary and Proper Clause is "not itself a grant of
power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out" the
powers specifically granted).
"' See id.
212 See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
24s
2 '" Id,
245 See id. at 153.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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laws reveal the same purpose. 248 The United States Supreme Court
generally requires a strong showing of congressional intent when
ruling that a state statute is preempted. 249
Because the United States Constitution lacks a federal escheat
provision, there is no explicit federal escheat power that parallels
the states' right to escheat. 25° Moreover, the federal government has
made no attempt to enact uniform national legislation regarding
unclaimed property. 251 Any uniformity of law that exists in the
United States is due to the relatively widespread state adoption of
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Acts. 252 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court has also stated that preemption principles
are applicable with regard to real property law even though it is a
matter of special concern to the states.253
A. Cases of Federal-State Conflict Over Unclaimed Property
In the state versus federal struggle.over unclaimed property in
federal custody, "conflict preemption" was indirectly addressed by
early state-federal escheat cases. 254 As early as 1923, when states
attempted to escheat unclaimed funds from federal custody, the
federal government claimed that state escheat interfered with the
federal functions of the institution and therefore was in conflict. 255
For example, in 1923, in First National Bank v. California, a national
245 See id. (Congress's intent may be inferred because the scheme of federal regulation
may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it" or because "the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforce-
ment of state laws on the same subject" or because "the object sought to be obtained by
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose").
245 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 1 l I S. Ct. 2395, 2403 (1991) (in light of Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court must be absolutely certain that Congress
intended to preempt).
25° See Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1336 (the Constitution makes no provision for
escheat and the federal government is considered to have no escheat power).
251 United States v. 5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1986).
252 See 1 EPSTEIN E AL., supra note 3, § 1.06[11(Supp. 1991). One commentator suggested
in 1952 that the federal government should enact comprehensive unclaimed property leg-
islation to settle the interstate problems over intangible unclaimed property. Note, Escheat of
Corporate Dividends, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1413 (1952). This commentator asserted that the
federal government could find authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id.
25s
	 Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
254
	 e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 369 (1923).
255 See id.
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bank successfully claimed that state escheat statutes were inappli-
cable to them because of their federal charter. 256
In First National Bank, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that California's state unclaimed property statute, which trans-
ferred title of abandoned property to the state, was invalid because
it conflicted with the general objectives and purpose of congres-
sional legislation concerning national banks, 257 In First National
Bank, the state statute provided that bank accounts that had re-
mained dormant for over twenty years should be turned over to
the state if the bank did not know whether the depositor was alive. 258
The First National Bank Court reasoned that allowing seizure of
such accounts under the state statute would dissolve the contract
between the depositor and the national bank. 259 The Court con-
cluded that state escheat might dissuade depositors from using the
bank for fear of confiscation.260 Thus, the First National Bank Court
held that the California state statute that transferred title in escheat
unduly interfered with the functions of a federal bank. 261
Twenty-one years later, in 1944, under a state escheat statute
that transferred only custody of unclaimed bank deposits, the Su-
preme Court limited the First National Bank holding, and the states
prevailed.262 in Anderson National Bank v: Luckett, the United States
Supreme Court again considered state escheat of unclaimed funds
held by national banks.265 In Luckett, the United States Supreme
Court held that a Kentucky statute that transferred custody of
abandoned deposits was valid and did not interfere with the federal
functions of the national bank. 2" •
In Luckett, the' Kentucky escheat statute was similar to the Cal-
ifornia statute in First National Bank except that it was custodial and
did not escheat title to the property. 265 The Kentucky statute trans-
ferred to the state custody of demand deposits after they were
dormant for ten years and non-demand deposits after they were
dormant for twenty-five years. 266 The statute required the holder
266
 Id. at 369-70.
2" Id. at 368-69, 370.
268
	 at 366.
2" Id. at 369.
260 Id. at 370.
261 See id.
262
	 Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 236, 250, 252-53 (1944).
266
 Id. at 236.
2" Id. at 252-53.
266 See ed. at 250, 251-52.
266 Id. at 238.
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to file a report of unclaimed deposits with both the state and the
sheriff of the county where the bank was located; the sheriff would
then post a copy of the report on the courthouse door. 267
The United States Supreme Court did not reverse First National
Bank but distinguished it, limiting its holding by stating that al-
though states have the power to escheat unclaimed deposits from
national banks, the terms under which escheat occurs cannot be so
harsh so as to deter depositors. 268 The Court reasoned that the
California statute in First National Bank interfered with the federal
functions of the bank because it escheated title, thus deterring
potential depositors. 269 In contrast, the Court reasoned that because
the Kentucky statute was custodial and did not provide for absolute
escheat of title unless abandonment had been proven, the depositors
would not be deterred from using the national bank. 27° The Court
concluded that the custodial statute did not conflict with the bank's
federal functions, 271 thus indirectly ruling that there was no conflict
preemption between the state escheat and the federal bank charter.
Consequently, after Luckett, states retained the right to custodial
escheat of unclaimed property from national banks despite their
status as federally chartered institutions."'
The right to escheat unclaimed funds in a national bank after
the bank has been liquidated was addressed in the 1949 case, Roth
v. Delano. 273 In Roth, the United States Supreme Court, in dicta,
restated its holding in Luckett and discussed the states' right to
escheat. 274 In Roth, an insolvent national bank had been liquidated
and the state of Michigan claimed that the remaining bank property
was subject to Michigan's escheat statutes. 275 The federal liquidators
refused to acknowledge the state claim.'"
In Roth, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that, as in
the case of Luckett, state escheat does not interfere with the bank's
federal functions. 277 The Roth Court further noted that it does not
burden a bank's federal functions for it to give to a state acting in
267 Id. at 237.
268
 See id. at 250.
269 See id. at 251-52.
270 See id.
271 See id. at 252.
"2 See I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, 7.12[1].
273 338 U.S. 226,227 (1949).
"4 Id. at 230.
276 Id. at 227.
276 See id. at 227-28.
27 Id. at 230.
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the shoes of the claimant that which the bank would have been
required to give to the claimant. 278 Although in Roth the Court
reiterated states' rights to escheat, the case was remanded in light
of a recent repeal of the underlying Michigan escheat statute. 279
Thus, after Luckett and Roth, states retained the right to regulate
unclaimed property in national banks despite the banks' federal
charter, as there was no conflict between the state laws and the
banks' federal functions. 2"
As with states' rights with respect to funds held in national
banks, it has also been held that state escheat laws do not conflict
with unclaimed funds held by a federal court. 28 ' In 1938, in United
States v. Klein, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether state escheat of unclaimed bond funds, which had been
collected by the court and then transferred to the United States
Treasury, infringed on federal jurisdiction. 282 The Klein Court held
that state escheat in this situation did not conflict and a state could
escheat unclaimed bond funds that a federal court had collected
and that had been transferred to the federal treasury. 283
In Klein, Pennsylvania sought to escheat under its state statute
unclaimed funds that had been paid in federal court for bonds but
which had not been claimed after seven years. 284 The Court stated
that, according to 28 U.S.C. § 852, after the funds were unclaimed
for more than five years, the money was deposited in the United
States Treasury. 285 The federal statute provided that the funds be
turned over to any claimant entitled to the money. 288 The federal
government claimed that Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction to invade
the sovereignty of the United States and that the state escheat statute
was unconstitutional. 287
278 Id.
279 1d. at 230-31.
288 Id. Although there has not been subsequent litigation regarding states' rights to
unclaimed property held by national banks, there has been ongoing litigation regarding state
inspection of the records of national banks and state regulation of national bank service
charges. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 3, 7.1211]. One commentator stated that because Roth
was not a clear decision regarding applicability of state unclaimed property laws to liquidated
national banks, many state unclaimed property statutes were modified to exclude national
banks in the process of liquidation. Prewitt, supra note 4, at 509.
281 See United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 280-81, 283 (1938) (Court permitted state
escheat of unclaimed bond funds collected by a federal court).
282 1d. at 277.
283 Id. at 282-83,
284 Id. at 277-78.
288 Id. at 277.
286 Id. at 280.
287 Id. at 277,279.
1066	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:1037
The Klein Court reasoned that the federal court retained juris-
diction over the unclaimed property for the sole purpose of paying
back rightful claims. 288 Because the federal government did not
claim any right to escheat the funds, and the federal statute pro-
vided for payment to rightful claimants, the Court concluded• that
federal possession of the money did not curtail state escheat
power. 289 Thus, the Klein Court held that the state statute did not
conflict with the federal jurisdiction of the court and the unclaimed
funds were subject to state escheat. 29°
Several district and appellate courts have indirectly supported
states' rights to escheat funds held in the custody of federal
courts.29 ' For example, in Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed an em-
ployer's claim alleging rights to unpaid wages owed to employees
under a 1970 court order. 292 The Hodgson court reasoned that under
the 1970 court order, unclaimed wages were to be transferred to
the United States Treasury but never escheat permanently to the
United States. 293 The court further reasoned in dicta that the wages
remained subject to the owner's claim or state escheat. 294
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court in Luckett,
Roth and Klein did not directly address federal conflict preemption,
in each of these cases, the Court reasoned that the state escheat
statute did not conflict with federal law.295 At least one commentator
has supported the conclusion that there is no conflict preemption
between federal custody statutes and state escheat statutes because
the funds in federal custody are subject to state escheat. 296
768 Id. at 281.
489 Id. at 280, 282.
290 Id. at 282.
"' See, e.g., Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 1971) (money
deposited in United States Treasury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041-42 never escheats
permanently to the federal government but remains subject to owner's claim or state escheat);
State v. Goodbar, 297 S.W.2d 525, 526, 528 (Mo. 1957) (insurance premiums impounded by
a federal district court and held in the court registry are escheatable by state).
292 446 F.2d at 529. The judgment requiring payment of wages at issue in Wheaton Glass
was from the ruling in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970). Hodgson,
446 F.2d at 529. The Schultz judgment provided that any sums not paid over to employees
or their personal representative were to be transferred into the Treasury of the United States
as miscellaneous receipts. Id.
495 Id. at 535.
294 1d.
295 See supra notes 263-90 and accompanying text for case discussions of Luckett, Roth
and Klein.
498
 See Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1337.
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There are areas, however, where the federal government has
successfully claimed rights to abandoned property. 297 Despite the
absence of formal federal authority for escheat rights, the federal
government has enacted certain legislation that claims rights to
abandoned property. 298 For example, under current federal law,
the United States takes title to unclaimed veterans' property under
authority from congressional war powers. 299 The law provides that
when a veteran dies intestate in a veterans' hospital, title to his or
her personal property vests in the United States."°
These statutes were initially upheld under a contract theory. 301
It was reasoned that a veteran's acceptance of federal benefits cre-
ated a contract between the , veteran and the federal government
under which funds paid to the veteran returned to the government
and did not become subject to state escheat. 302 Under the contract
theory, the federal government effectively escheated the property
and the courts avoided the issue of preemption of state escheat laws.
Subsequently, the contract theory.was questioned because there
was not always a contract between the veteran and the govern-
ment. 503 In United States v. Oregon, in 1961, the United States Su-
preme Court considered federal claims to property that had be-
longed to a veteran who had been incompetent when he had been
admitted to the veterans' hospital. and thus, could not have been
bound to a contract. 504 Reasoning that the federal statute was nec-
essary and proper under the , federal war powers, the Oregon Court
held that the property was subject to federal, not state laws. 503
297 See infra notes 297-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of several areas where
the federal government has successfully claimed abandoned property.
299 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 6408 (1988) (removing unclaimed tax refunds from the scope
of state escheat and abandoned property law); 38 U.S.C. § 5220 (1988), amended by 38 U.S.C.A.
8520 (West 1991) (allowing the federal government to take title to unclaimed veterans'
property).
299 38 U.S.C. § 5220 (1988). This section provides that when a veteran dies without a
will or legal heirs in a veterans' hospital, his or her personal property "shall immediately vest
in and become the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of
the General Post Fund." Id. U.S. Coms-r. art. 1, 8. The War Powers of Congress include the
power "to declare War ... To raise and support Armies . . . To provide and maintain a
Navy . To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States."
soo Id,
991 See Modern Escheat, supra note 3, at 1337.
902 Id,
3°3 See id. at 1338.
504 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 644 (1961).
995 Id. at 649.
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In Oregon, the incompetent veteran had died without heirs in
a veterans' hospital after receiving a $13,000 inheritance from his
brother. 306 After his death, both the federal government and Ore-
gon claimed the money. 3°7 Oregon claimed it under its state un-
claimed property laws, and the federal government claimed its vet-
erans' statute was valid and therefore preempted the state law."
The Supreme Court reasoned that because Congress had a
strong interest in veterans, the federal statute was necessary and
proper to the exercise of congressional administration of veterans'
issues, a federal war power. 3°9 The Court further reasoned that an
applicable and valid federal statute preempts the state law."° Thus,
the Court held that the federal statute was constitutional and the
veteran's property went to the federal rather than the state govern-
ment. 3 "
The federal government's right to administer the area of vet-
erans' benefits is a power granted to Congress as a constitutional
war power.312 Therefore, preemption of state unclaimed property
laws in this area is "implied preemption," because the federal gov-
ernment occupies the field of veterans' administration. 3 ' 3
Justice Douglas questioned the validity of this implied preemp-
tion in his dissent to Oregon.'" Justice Douglas argued that the
property at issue in Oregon was an inheritance that the veteran had
received from his brother.3 15 Douglas argued that inheritance laws
at issue in Klein are very different from general veterans' adminis-
tration.316 Reasoning that the. Tenth Amendment provided the
states with a definitive right to control the area of property succes-
sion and escheat, Douglas argued that federal claims to veterans'
property are not necessary and proper to any federal power. 317 In
addition, Douglas argued that the congressional use of veterans'
3°6 Id, at 643.
3°7 1d. at 643-44.
9011
3" See id. at 648-49.
31O/41. at 644.
3 " See id. at 645.
512 Id. at 648-49. See supra note 299 for a discussion of congressional war powers granted
by the United States Constitution.
313 See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of implied preemp-
tion.
314 See Oregon, 366 U.S. at 649 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"5 Id. at 650 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3 ' 6 Id. at 651 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
317 Id. at 654 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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property as a source for funding the General Post Fund was not a
legitimate source of congressional revenue."' Further asserting that
the federal government has been granted explicit constitutional
means for raising money through taxation and borrowing, Douglas
argued that "[r]aising money by appropriating assets of those who
have a relationship with the Federal Government (as most people
do today) is not among the enumerated powers." 319
Another area where the federal government has prevailed over
state unclaimed property laws is in regard to federal income tax
refunds. 32° In 1987, Congress enacted legislation that expressly ex-
cluded unclaimed federal income tax refunds from state unclaimed
property law. 3" This law was upheld as constitutional by the New
York Court of Appeals as being a necessary and proper means of
carrying out the federal government's taxing power. 322 Thus, the
federal government expressly preempted state unclaimed property
law in this specific area.
The federal government once again successfully claimed fed-
eral preemption in the most recent controversy over unclaimed
property in federal custody in Arizona v. Bowsher. 323 The controversy
involved unclaimed trust fund monies that the United States Trea-
sury claimed under 31 U.S.C. § 1322. 324 Thirty-one U.S.C. § 1322
establishes an account that is a pool of unclaimed money from
various trust funds. 325 The federal statute provides that each year
the Secretary of the Treasury pays into this account all monies that
have owners with unknown locations and that have remained un-
claimed for one year.326 The title of the account is "Unclaimed
Moneys of Individuals Whose Whereabouts are Unknown," and
subsequent claims are to be paid from this fund.'" Thirty-one
318 Id. at 654-55 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
319 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
”° See In re Abrams, 556 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
321 26 U.S.C. 6408 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part. that "(nlo overpay-
ment of any tax shall be refunded (and no interest with respect to any such overpayment
shall be paid) if the amount of such refund (or interest) would escheat to a State or would
otherwise become the property of a State under any law relating to the disposition of
unclaimed or abandoned property." Id,
322 In re Abrams, 556 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (1990). This case was first brought before the
enactment of 26 U.S.C. § 6408; thus, the New York unclaimed property law prevailed. See
In re Abrams. 512 N,Y.S.2d 962, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
323 935 F.2d 332, 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama v. Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
324 Id, at 333.
'25 Id.
32'1 Id.
327 Id.
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U.S.C. § 1322, unlike the income tax provision, 26 U.S.C. § 6408,
does not contain language to expressly preempt state unclaimed
property laws. 328 Nor does 26 U.S.C. § 1322 take title to the un-
claimed property as did the veterans' statute, 38 U.S.C. § 5200.' 29
In 1990, in Arizona v. Bowsher, acting under their unclaimed
property laws, twenty-three states attempted to claim custody of
unclaimed property held by the United States Treasury pursuant
to 31 U.S.C. § 1322. 330 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that state unclaimed property laws are
preempted by the federal custody statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1322."' The
court reasoned that the state unclaimed property laws stood as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives
of Congress because it would amount to direct regulation of federal
operations or property."2
In Bowsher, the states argued that the fund established under
31 U.S.C. § 1322 was comprised of unclaimed money that was
subject to state unclaimed property laws."' The states further ar-
gued that the federal statute was merely a bookkeeping mechanism
and that neither the language nor the legislative history of § 1322
showed congressional intent to preempt."4 The states further al-
leged that compliance with the state unclaimed property laws would
not burden any federal interest; rather, the federal and state statutes
dovetailed and both could be complied with.'"
The District Court for the District of Columbia reasoned that
because 31 U.S.C. § 1322 provided for federal custody of the money
and did. not provide for transfer to the states' -custody, state and
federal laws could not coexist." 6 Thus, the court held that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires the federal law to
take precedence and 31 U.S.C. § 1322 preempts state unclaimed
property laws."'
32 See id. See supra note 321 and accompanying text for a discussion of 26 U.S.C. § 6408.
329 See Bowsher, 935 F.2d at 333. See supra note 299 and accompanying text for a discussion
of 38 U.S.C. § 5200.
1" Bowsher, 935 F.2d at 334.
111
 Id. at 333.
1" Id. at 334-35.
3 33
 Id:
 at 333.
334 Final Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3-4, Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama v. Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991) (No. 90-5184).
535
 Id. at 1 .2.
96 See Alabama v. Bowsher, 734 F. Supp. 525, 542 (D.D.C. 1990).
977 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed the District Court opinion. 338 The appellate
court reasoned that the federal government had a property interest
in the money because it was in . the United States Treasury and states
may not regulate the federal government's operations or prop-
erty.339 The Bowsher court further reasoned that the state statutes
stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
congressional objectives because Congress wanted to provide con-
venience to the claimant. 340 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
government and the owner would more likely recognize the federal
government than the states as the payor. 34 '
In addition, the Bowsher court discdunted the traditional strong
state interest and authority in unclaimed property. 342 The court
reasoned that because the state statutes that were preempted were
custodial statutes, they were 'distinguishable from escheat where title
is foreclosed and therefore did noi have the same validity. 343 Al-
though the court acknowledged that the'Supreme Court has treated
custodial unclaimed property statutes the same as non-custodial
statutes, the court concluded that they are not equivalent in all
contexts. 944 Nevertheless, the court, citing United States v. Klein, ac-
knowledged that the state takes the place of the claimant in some
situations. 345
Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the states' claim to the unclaimed money in the
fund under 31 U.S.C. § 1322' was prohibited as an attempt to
regulate government property, and was preempted under the Su-
premacy Clause.346 The state appealed to the United States Supreme
Court for a grant of certiorari. 347 It was denied in 1991. 348
"6 Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332, 333 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama v. Bowsher,
112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
339 Id. at 334.
44° Id. at 335.
34
342 Id.
"' See id.
344
'45 Id. See supra notes 282-90 for a discussion of United States v. Klein.
346 Id. at 334-35.
947
	
v. Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
348 Id.
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B. Current Federal-State Disputes Over Unclaimed Property
Total unclaimed dollars held by the federal government ap-
proximate $6.5 billion. A 1989 study by the Governmental Account-
ing Office ("GAO") states that $1.5 billion of the unclaimed property
is collected and held by six federal agencies included in the study.349
There are also at least $5 billion of unclaimed United States Trea-
sury checks as indicated by the Financial Management Service. 35°
The GAO report examined the existing methods a few of the agen-
cies used for locating owners of unclaimed property."' The report
acknowledged that the federal government does not have any uni-
versal requirements for federal agencies to locate owners."' Some
agencies have recently established procedures, while others consider
it too costly."'
The GAO report indicates that although a few agencies like
the Office of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") are fully automated, and there-
fore relatively successful in finding owners and in returning un-
claimed property, other agencies are not. 354
 The Office of Personnel
Management has 35,000 file cabinets of unautomated federal re-
tirement records and thus is less capable of identifying missing
owners and processing claims than other agencies."' The GAO
report also acknowledges that there are wide information gaps in
some federal agencies."' For example, the Bureau of the Public
Debt does not have social security numbers or current addresses
for owners of currently maturing U.S. Savings Bonds that were
issued thirty to fifty years ago. 357 Thus, the report acknowledges
that in some areas, locating missing owners is unlikely.
A former president of the National Association of Unclaimed
Property Administrators ("NAUPA") revealed that the states are
still involved in discussions with the federal government regarding
unclaimed property in federal custody. 358
 One possibility currently
333
 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
33° Telephone Interview with Andy Montgomery, supra note 6.
35i GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
552 See id,
353 Id.
354
 See id. at 26-34.
355 See id. at 4.
353 Id.
357 Id.
353
 Telephone Interview with Lorin Nielsen, former President of the National Association
of Unclaimed Property Administrators (March 10, 1992).
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being discussed is that the federal government might turn over the
unclaimed property records, not the money, to the state. 359 Under
existing state unclaimed property legislation, the state will then
attempt to locate the missing owners. 36° Proponents of this plan
suggest that it would further the interests of the missing owners,
yet allow the federal government to keep any remaining unclaimed
money.36 ' This arrangement, they argue, would eliminate the need
to create a completely separate federal unclaimed property bureau-
cracy to locate missing owners. 362 The argument concludes that the
states benefit by getting even partial federal compliance with state
unclaimed property statutes. 363 In addition, because the federal
government retains the billions of dollars in unclaimed funds, sup-
porters contend that the federal government should contribute
funding to help support the state administrative costs associated
with locating missing owners. 364
The states have been trying a legislative approach as well.
NAUPA has supported an Unclaimed Property Bill that would
require the federal agencies to turn over unclaimed property to the
states. 365 The Unclaimed Property Bill has been proposed several
times without success. 366 Commentators have noted that because
complying with state unclaimed property laws will cost the federal
government money, in the absence of a strong public push, it is
unlikely that any congressional action will protect states' rights to
unclaimed property in federal custody. 367 •
In sum, the states have a long history of regulating the un-
claimed property of their citizens. 368 The judiciary has supported
states' rights to unclaimed property, both for absolute and custodial
escheat statutes.369 Most states have developed comprehensive un-
5" Id.
'6° Id.
Id.; Telephone Interview with Patty White, supra note 1.
362 Telephone Interview with Lorin Nielsen, supra note 358; Telephone Interview with
Patty White, supra note 1.
36 ' Telephone Interview with Lorin Nielsen, supra note 358.
364 Id.
565 See S. 1612, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
566 See id. (status indicated in 1 Cong. Index (CCH), 100th Cong., at 21,035 (1987); S.
1780, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (status indicated in 1 Cong. Index (CCH), 99th Cong., at 21,034
(1985)).
567 Telephone Interview with Lorin Nielsen, supra note 358.
568 See supra notes 67-228 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of state
regulation of unclaimed property.
369 See supra notes 73-93, 134-56, 178-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of
judicial support of state regulation of unclaimed property.
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claimed property legislation modeled after the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Acts. 37° Despite the long history of state control of un-
claimed property, over $6.5 billion is held by the federal govern-
ment and continues to be a significant legal and political issue. 37 '
The decision in Arizona v. Bowsher currently stands in the way of
state legal remedies; however, the underlying issues are far from
settled.
V. WHY THE STATES SHOULD RETAIN THEIR
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY POWER
The United States adopted the doctrines of escheat and bona
vacantia under a unified doctrine of escheat. States claim the right
to escheat as an extension of their sovereign right of the people
and under their general police power. States.have gradually codified
the escheat doctrine in the form of unclaimed property law. The
Supreme Court has affirmed the states' rights to almost all types of
unclaimed property. 372
State custody of abandoned property benefits all parties in-
volved in various ways. Missing owners can appear and successfully
claim property, and society benefits through the states' custody of
the property by having use of funds that would otherwise be a
windfall to the holder, and the holders are relieved of liability and
the expense of maintaining records. 373
Despite the case law and state statutes governing unclaimed
property, the right of states to claim custody of unclaimed obliga-
tions owed by the federal government remains unsettled. Under
the authority of federal legislation, federal agencies have claimed
rights to abandoned property including veterans' benefits and Trea-
sury funds. The current conflict exists over whether the federal
government should be the appropriate holder for unclaimed funds
held by federal agencies. Although there is no express preemption
under federal law, federal agencies hold approximately $6.5 billion
in unclaimed money. 374
3" See supra notes 164-77, 203-06, 210-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Acts.
"1 See supra notes 254-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal versus
state conflict over unclaimed property.
"2 See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development
of state unclaimed property legislation.
"3
 See supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of rationales for state
custody of unclaimed property.
3" See supra notes 254-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal versus
state conflict over unclaimed property in federal custody.
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There are four key issues in the controversy over federal
preemption of state unclaimed property laws. First, are federal
statutes that expressly preempt state unclaimed property laws con-
stitutional? Second, do federal custody statutes, absent express
congressional intent to preempt, impliedly preempt state unclaimed
property laws? Within this issue is the stated purpose of both federal
and state statutes of returning property to missing owners. Third,
should the Supreme Court precedent set in United States v. Klein for
state escheat of funds in federal custody control subsequent cases?
Finally, is Congress or are the courts best suited to settle this con-
troversy?
A. Constitutionality of Federal Escheat
When the states challenged federal statutes governing un-
claimed veterans' property and unclaimed federal income tax re-
funds which expressly preempted state unclaimed property laws,
the federal government prevailed. 3" Nevertheless, the federal gov-
ernment found constitutional authority for the veterans' property
legislation as necessary and proper for acting under the federal war
powers. 376 For federal income tax refunds, the federal government's
legislation was found to be necessary and proper for the adminis-
tration of federal taxes.'" Thus, in each of these cases, the power
for federal preemption of the state unclaimed property law was
specific to a defined area of constitutional power. Congress does not
necessarily have the power to enact preemptive legislation in an
area where there is not a specific grant of federal power.
The district court in Bowsher reasoned that Congress has au-
thority to place unclaimed money in the custody of the Secretary
of the Treasury because disbursing funds and paying debts is a
constitutional function.' 78 The question is not whether Congress has
the authority to place the money in the federal treasury, but rather
whether it has the right to retain the funds as revenue rather than
disperse them to the states as rightful claimants.
575 See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961) (upholding 38 U.S.C. § 17,
which provides for federal claims to unclaimed veterans' property); In re Abrams, 556
N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upholding 26 U.S.C. § 6408, which expressly
removes unclaimed federal income tax refunds from the scope of state abandoned property
law).
"6 See supra note 299 and accompanying text for a discussion of the veterans' statute.
377 See supra note 321 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal tax statute.
378 Alabama v. Bowsher, 734 F. Stipp. 525, 540 (1990), aff'd, Arizona v. Bowsher, 935
F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Alabama v. Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
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It is the revenue aspect of unclaimed property that suggests
that federal claims to retain unclaimed property are unconstitu-
tional. Because it is recognized that a large percentage of owners
will not claim the funds, unclaimed property is a significant source
of non-tax revenue. 379
 Numerous commentators and courts have
acknowledged the revenue aspects of both custodial and non-cus-
todial escheat. 38° The issue is whether this is revenue that belongs
to the federal or state governments.
Federal escheat, even custodial escheat, is an unconstitutional
source of revenue. As Justice Douglas argued in his dissent in United
States v. Oregon, the federal government has the right to tax and
borrow to raise money."' Raising revenue by escheat of property
of citizens who have a relationship with the federal government is
an infringement on the Tenth Amendment rights of the states,
particularly in view of the strong state interest and comprehensive
state law regarding unclaimed property.
B. Validity of Implied Preemption
The federal government has gradually carved away specific
areas of unclaimed property from state regulation through express
preemption. 382
 Congress has done this by legislating to exclude
specific areas of federal control from being subject to state un-
claimed property laws or by enacting its own escheat statutes. 383
These incidents of congressional carving away of state control are
clearly intended to preempt the state laws and, although it may not
be completely within the authority of Congress to enact this legis-
lation, the preemptive intent is clear in each case. Nevertheless,
congressional intent to preempt state unclaimed property laws is
not evident with regard to federal custody statutes. 384 These types
529 See supra notes 105- 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revenue aspects
of unclaimed property.
38° See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revenue aspects
of unclaimed property.
" I
 366 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"' See supra notes 236-53, 297-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal
preemption of state unclaimed property laws.
"' See supra notes 297-332 and accompanying text for a discussion of express federal
preemption of state unclaimed property laws regarding veterans' property and unclaimed
federal income tax refunds.
3" See supra notes 323-48 for a discussion of the federal implied preemption in Arizona
v. Bowsher.
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of statutes are bookkeeping statutes and do not include provisions
to exempt them from state laws.
The appellate court in Bowsher addressed this type of custody
statute and still focused on preemption, holding that the state un-
claimed property laws obstructed the objectives of Congress.385
Compliance with the state laws does not interfere with the purposes
and objectives of Congress. There is nothing in the statute to show
congressional intent to preempt state laws. 386 Rather, the stated
purpose for enacting 31 U.S.C. § 1322 was to create a time-saving
bookkeeping device to facilitate payment of claims by the Treasury.
The federal statute simply creates an account to hold unclaimed
funds. It does not mention locating missing owners or even main-
taining records of the unclaimed property. On the agency level,
although there are areas where the federal government is attempt-
ing to locate owners and process claims, only a few agencies are
doing so. 387 The fact that there are no established procedures
among all of the agencies is a good reason why the states should
have custody.
Some federal agencies are not capable of handling claims by
missing owners, especially if the list of missing owners is to be
published regularly as it is in many states. Rather than create a
federal bureaucracy capable of handling the claims, the federal
government should use the existing state administrators, who have
an established system for processing claims. Because the stated pur-
pose of the federal statute 31 U.S.C. § 1322 was to facilitate pay-
ments to missing owners, the Treasury should recognize the savings
in time and money by turning over the unclaimed funds to the
states. At the very least, the agencies should turn over the records
to the states and assist in processing claims.
In Bowsher, the appellate court was clearly hostile to states' rights
and did not even attempt to dovetail the federal statute with the
state legislation. State unclaimed property legislation does not con-
flict with 31 U.S.C. § 1322 because both the federal and the state
statutes can be complied with. Because the Treasurer is merely a
58' See Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2c1 332, 334-35, 336 (D,G. Cir,), cert, denied, Alabama
v. Bowsher, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
3" See supra note 334 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal intent behind
26 U.S.C. § 1322.
' 8' See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited federal
efforts to locate missing owners of unclaimed property.
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custodian for the funds, subsequent state escheat does not conflict
with the federal statute.
C. Supreme Court Precedent
The second issue is whether the ruling in United States v. Klein
should control state claims to unclaimed property in federal cus-
tody. 388 In Klein, the United States Supreme Court held that a state
escheat statute was applicable to unclaimed funds that had been
collected by the federal court and subsequently transferred to the
United States Treasury."'" The district court in Bowsher, however,
distinguished United States v. Klein by stating that Klein involved
escheat of title, whereas Bowsher involved custodial escheat. 39° The
court's reasoning on this issue was faulty. States began enacting
custodial escheat legislation as early as 1897 and the United States
Supreme Court has ruled on numerous state custodial escheat cases
where the Court enforced states' rights."' For example, in Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, the Court reasoned that the state escheat
statutes were valid as applied to the federal bank specifically because
the state statute was custodial and the depositors were protected. 392
Commentators have argued that the United States Supreme Court
has upheld state unclaimed property statutes whether they are cus-
todial or whether they foreclose the owners' rights, either immedi-
ately or eventually."'
The courts favored the shift to state custodial statutes because
they better protected the interests of the owners. 394
 All of the Uni-
form Unclaimed Property Acts are custodial statutes, so almost all
states have custodial unclaimed property statutes. 3J3 Thus, the dis-
tinction made by the Bowsher court between custodial and non-
custodial escheat is meritless. It should not make any difference to
the holder of the property whether or not the state is going to claim
58a
	 303 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1938).
'89 Id.
3" Alabama v. Bowsher, 734 F. Supp. 525, 534 n.13 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, Arizona v.
Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
391
 See supra notes 73-93, 134-56, 178-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the judicial support for state unclaimed property laws.
"' 321 U.S. 233, 251-52 (1944).
393 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 1, at 1436.
"4
 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the shift to custodial
escheat,
'95 See supra nate 228 and accompanying text for a discussion of states adopting the
Uniform Acts.
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title to or custody of unclaimed funds. The relevant issue is that
the state has a better claim than a fortuitous holder. The federal
government in this situation is no less the lucky "windfall" holder
than a private holder, especially those agencies that utilize the un-
claimed property to fund their own operating expenses.
D. Who Should Decide?
The fourth question is whether this is an issue that is better
suited for congressional rather than judicial action." 6 It is unlikely
that in light of the federal deficit, Congress is going to allow any
source of revenue to be taken away. Although attempts are being
made to get congressional legislation passed to require agencies to
turn over unclaimed funds directly to the states, the bill has never
even made it to committee. Unless pressured by constituents,
congressional legislators are not likely to pass a bill that will make
the federal deficit worse. Thus, the judiciary should take steps to
protect the rights of the states and the missing owners.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current controversy between the state and federal govern-
ment over custody of funds retained by federal agencies involves
the fundamental historic right of states to regulate unclaimed prop-
erty. Federal custodial escheat does not preempt state laws and does
little to further the interests of the owners: Thus, state unclaimed
property laws should be enforceable against the federal govern-
ment. Although the appellate decision in Arizona v. Bowsher has
halted states' legal recourse, at the very least, the federal agencies
should work with the states and support state efforts to locate
missing owners and reunite them with their abandoned property.
SUSAN T. KELLY
"6 See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of state attempts at
legislative action.
